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NLSIR

STATE SURVEILLANCE AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INDIA: A
CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY
Gautam Bhatia1

I. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the explosive Snowden disclosures in May 2013, Stat

and citizens' right to privacy have been at the forefront of internat

Even as the Snowden documents were revealing, detail by detail,
and British intelligence agencies' extensive surveillance system
TEMPORA, among others) used to spy both on their own citize
communications elsewhere, reports about Indian bulk surveilla
trickle in. It is now known that there are at least two surveillan
India, in uncertain stages of preparation: the Central Monitoring
which provides for the collection of telephony metadata by tapping

ecommunications' companies records2; and Netra, a dragnet surve

that detects and sweeps up electronic communication that uses certa

such as "attack", "bomb", "blast" or "kill". These programs, wide

and scope, have dubious statutory backing. They also, very clearly, i

basic fundamental rights. A discussion of the legal and constitu
tions, therefore, is long overdue.

This essay presents an analytical and chronological history of
Supreme Court's engagement with the right to privacy. While di
privacy statute have stagnated and are presently in limbo3, the

active for nigh on fifty years. This essay aims to achieve a compreh
trinal understanding of the constitutional right to privacy, as evolv
and implemented by the judiciary. Such an understanding, indeed, is

1 Advócate, Delhi High Court.
2 P. Munkaster, India Introduces Central Monitoring System , The Register, 8-5

<http://www.theregistcr.co.uk/2013/05/08/india_privacy_woes_central_monitoring

visited on 10-2-2015).
3 Centre for Internet and Society, An Analysis of the New Draft Privacy Bill ,
2014, available at <http://www.medianama.com/2014/03/223-an-analysis-of-the-n
bill-cis-india/> (last visited on 10-2-2015).
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prerequisite to embarking upon a legal and constitutional critique of m
surveillance in India.

II. FOUNDATIONS

Privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution. It plays no

Constituent Assembly Debates. Indeed, a proposal to include a pro
the American Fourth Amendment (and the root of American priv
hibiting 'unreasonable searches and seizures', was expressly reje

Assembly. The place of the right - if it exists - must therefore be lo
the structure of the Constitution, as fleshed out by judicial decisions
The first case to address the issue was M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra 4 in

1954. In that case, the Court upheld search and seizure in the following terms:

"A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the protection of
social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law.
When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject
such regulation to Constitutional limitations by recognition of a
fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the American Fourth
Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally

different fundamental right by some process of strained con-

struction." (emphasis supplied)

The right in question was Art. 19(l)(f) - the right to
the Court did not reject a right to privacy altogether

context of searches and seizures for documents, th
American Fourth Amendment (that has no analogue
tion, however, would not last too long, and was under
to consider this question, Kharak Singh5.

In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P .6, the UP Police Reg
lance power upon certain " history sheeters " - that is
necessarily convicted) of a crime. These surveillance p
eting of the suspect's house, domiciliary visits at nigh

and associations, and reporting and verifying his m
lenged on Article 19(l)(d) (freedom of movement) a

erty) grounds. It is the second ground that particular

4 AIR 1954 SC 300 ("MP. Sharma").
5 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
6 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 (" Kharak Singh").
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As a preliminary matter, we may observe that the Regulations in
were administrative - that is, they did not constitute a iaw', passed by

lature. This automatically ruled out a 19(2) - 19(6) defence, and a 21
established by law " defence - which were only applicable when the
a law. The reason for this is obvious: fundamental rights are extrem

tant. If one is to limit them, then that judgment must be made by a co

legislature , acting through the proper, deliberative channels of lawmak
not by mere administrative or executive action. Consequently - and

apart from the question of administrative/executive competence - i
Regulations were found to violate Article 19 or Article 21, that mad
facto void, without the exceptions kicking in.

It is also important to note one other thing: as a defence, it was
argued by the State that the police action was reasonable and in the
maintaining public order precisely because it was "directed only ag
who were on proper grounds suspected to be of proved anti-socia
tendencies and on whom it was necessary to impose some restraints for
tection of society. "7 The Court agreed, observing that this would have
whelming and even decisive weight in establishing that the classifi
rational and that the restrictions were reasonable and designed to pr
lic order by suitable preventive action '* - if there had been a law i
place, which there wasn't. Thus, this issue itself was hypothetical,
crucial to note is that the State argued - and the Court endorsed - the b
that what makes surveillance reasonable under Article 19 is the very fa
targeted - targeted at individuals who are specifically suspected of bein
to society because of a history of criminality.

Let us now move to the merits. The Court upheld secret picket

ground that it could not affect the petitioner's freedom of movement
well, secret. What you don't know, apparently, cannot hurt you. What
found fault with was the intrusion into the petitioner's dwelling, and k

his door late at night to wake him up. The finding required the Court t

the meaning of the term " personal liberty " in Article 21. By contrastin
specific rights listed in Article 21, the Court held that:

"Is then the word "personal liberty" to be construed as exclud
ing from its purview an invasion on the part of the police o
the sanctity of a man's home and an intrusion into his personal

security and his right to sleep which is the normal comfor
and a dire necessity for human existence even as an animal?
It might not be inappropriate to refer here to the words of the

preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to "assure th
7 Kharak Singh , AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1299 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 339.
8 Kharak Singh , AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1299 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 339.
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dignity of the individual" and therefore of those cherished
human value as the means of ensuring his full development and

evolution. We are referring to these objectives of the framers
merely to draw attention to the concepts underlying the consti-

tution which would point to such vital words as "personal liberty" having to be construed in a reasonable manner and to be
attributed that these which would promote and achieve those
objectives and by no means to stretch the meaning of the phrase
to square with any preconceived notions or doctrinaire constitu-

tional theories."9 (emphasis supplied)

A few important observations need to be made about this parag
is that it immediately follows the Court's examination of the Am
Fourteenth Amendments, with their guarantees of "fi/è, liberty

and is, in turn, followed by the Court's examination of the

Amendment, which guarantees the protection of a person's house

etc from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court's eng
Fourth Amendment is ambiguous. It admits that "owr Constit

like guarantee ...", but holds that nonetheless 44 these extracts [fr

Wolf v. Colorado ,0] would show that an unauthorised intrusi

home and the disturbance caused to him thereby , is as it were t
common law right of a man - an ultimate essential of ordered lib
its own holding in some way to the American Fourth Amendmen

Crucially, however, at this point , American Fourth Amendme
was propertarian based - that is, the Fourth Amendment was un
ify - with added protection - the common law of trespass, wher
erty was held sacrosanct, and not open to be trespassed against. F
in 1967, in Katz11, the Supreme Court would shift its own jurisp
ing that the Fourth Amendment protected zones where persons
expectation of privacy ", as opposed to simply protecting listed i
(homes, papers, effects etc). Kharak Singh 12 was handed down b

the quoted paragraph expressly shows that the Court anticipa

expressly grounding the Article 21 personal liberty right within
dignity , utterly rejected the propertarian-tresspass foundations t

had. To use a phrase invoked by later Courts - in this proto-

Court already set the tone by holding it to attach to persons , not

9 Kharak Singh , AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1302 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 349.
10 93 L Ed 1782 : 338 US 25 (1949).
M Katz v. United States, 19 L Ed 2d 576 : 389 US 347 (1967).
12 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
13 19 L Ed 2d 576 : 389 US 347 (1967).
14 19 L Ed 2d 576 : 389 US 347 (1967).
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While effectively finding a right to privacy in the Constitution, t
expressly declined to frame it that way. In examining police action
involved tracking a person's location, association and movements, t

upheld it, holding that "the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right un
Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an

ual which is merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infri

of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III"15 (emphasis su

The " therefore " is crucial. Although not expressly, the Court virtuall
in terms, that tracking location, association and movements does violate p
and only finds that constitutional because there is no guaranteed right to
within the Constitution. Yet.

In his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, Subba Rao,
one further, by holding that the idea of privacy was, in fact, contain
the meaning of Article 21: "it is true our Constitution à oes not ex
declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an
tial ingredient of personal liberty ." Privacy he defined as the right t
from restrictions or encroachments on his person , whether those re
or encroachments are directly imposed or indirectly brought about
culated measures .",6 On this ground, he held all the surveillance m
unconstitutional.

Justice Subba Rao's opinion also explored a proto-version of the c
effect. Placing specific attention upon the word "freely contained wi

(d)'s guarantee of free movment, Justice Subba Rao went specifically agai
majority, and observed:

"The freedom of movement in clause (d) therefore must be a
movement in a free country, i.e., in a country where he can do

whatever he likes, speak to whomsoever he wants, meet people
of his own choice without any apprehension, subject of course
to the law of social control. The petitioner under the shadow of
surveillance is certainly deprived of this freedom. He can move

physically, but he cannot do so freely, for all his activities are
watched and noted. The shroud of surveillance cast upon him
perforce engender inhibitions in him and he cannot act freely as

he would like to do. We would, therefore, hold that the entire
Regulation 236 offends also Art. 19(l)(d) of the Constitution."17

(emphasis supplied)

15 Kharak Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1303 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 334.
16 Kharak Singh , AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1306 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 360 (Subba Rao, J. disse
17 Kharak Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1295, 1306 : (1964) 1 SCR 332, 361.
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This early case, therefore, has all the aspects that plague mass surveil
today. What to do with administrative action that does not have the sanc
law? What role does targeting play in reasonableness - assuming there is
What is the philosophical basis for the implicit right to privacy within the
ing of Article 2Fs guarantee of personal liberty? And is the chilling effect a
constitutional concern?

III. GOBIND AND THE COMPELLING
STATE INTEREST TEST

After its judgment in Kharak Singh1*, the Court was not concern

privacy question for a while. The next case that dealt - peripher
issue came eleven years later. In R.M. Malkani v. State of Mahar
Court held that attaching a recording device to a person's telephone
late Section 25 of the Telegraph Act20, because:

"where a person talking on the telephone allows another p
son to record it or to hear it, it can-not be said that the ot
person who is allowed to do so is damaging, removing, ta

pering, touching machinery battery line or post for intercept
or acquainting himself with the contents of any message. The
was no element of coercion or compulsion in attaching the tap
recorder to the telephone."21

Although this case was primarily about the admissibility of
Court also took time out to consider - and reject - a privacy-bas
argument, holding that:

"Article 21 was invoked by submitting that the privacy of
appellant's conversation was invaded. Article 21 contempla
procedure established by law with regard to deprivation of lif
or personal liberty. The telephonic conversation of an inno
citizen will be protected by Courts against wrongful or h
handed interference by tapping the conversation. The protect
is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police
vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public servant
must not be understood that the Courts will tolerate safeguar
for the protection of the citizen to be imperiled by permittin
the police to proceed by unlawful or irregular methods."22
(emphasis supplied)
18 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
19 (1973) 1 SCC 471, 476 ("R.M. Malkani").
20 S. 15, Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
21 R.M. Malkani , (1973) 1 SCC 471, 476.
22 R.M. Malkani , (1973) 1 SCC 471, 479.
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Apart from the fact that it joined Kharak Singh 23 in refusing to ex

a privacy right within the contours of Article 21, there is somet

unites Kharak Singh 24 and R.M. Malkani 2S: the hypothetical in Kha

became a reality in R.M. Malkani11. What saved the telephone tap

because it was directed at "... a guilty person ", with the Court specif

ing that the laws were not for targeting innocent people. Once ag
targeted and specific nature of interception became a crucial - an
a decisive - factor. One year later, in another search and seizure
Mai v. Director of Inspection (Investigation)1* , the Court cited M

and stuck to its guns, refusing to incorporate the Fourth Amendmen
Constitutional law.

It is Gobind v. State of M.P?0, decided in 1975, that marks the watershed
moment for Indian privacy law in the Constitution. Like Kharak Singh31, GobincP 2

also involved domiciliary visits to the house of a history-sheeter. Unlike Kharak
Singhn , however, in GobincP 4 the Court found that the Regulations did have
statutory backing - Section 46(2)(c) of the Police Act35, which allowed State
Government to make notifications giving effect to the provisions of the Act, one
of which was the prevention of commission of offences. The surveillance provi-

sions in the impugned regulations, according to the Court, were indeed for the
purpose of preventing offences, since they were specifically aimed at repeat
offenders. To that extent, then, the Court found that there existed a valid 'law' for

the purposes of Articles 19 and 21.
By this time, of course, American constitutional law had moved forward sig-

nificantly from eleven years ago, when Kharak Singh 36 had been decided. The
Court was able to invoke Griswold v. Connecticut 37 and Roe v. Wade 38, both
of which had found 'privacy' as an " interstitial or " penumbraP ' right in the
American Constitution - that is, not reducible to any one provision, but implicit

in a number of separate provisions taken together. The Court ran together a

23
24
25
26
27
28

AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
(1973) 1 SCC 471.
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
(1973) 1 SCC 471.
(1974) 1 SCC 345.

29 AIR 1954 SC 300.

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

(1975) 2 SCC 148 (' 'Gobind').
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
(1975) 2 SCC 148.
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
(1975) 2 SCC 148.
S.46(2)(c), Police Act, 1861.
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
14 L Ed 2d 510 : 381 US 479 (1965).
35 L Ed 2d 147: 410 US 113 (1973).
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number of American authorities, referred to Locke and Kant, to dignity, t

and to autonomy, and ended by holding, somewhat confusingly:

"... the right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to
the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give
analytical picture of that distinctive characteristics of the right
of privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as

unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty... there are two possible theories for protecting privacy of home. The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause
offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might

he engaging in such activities and that such 'harm' is not
Constitutionally protective by the state. The second is that indi-

viduals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from
societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that
individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from project-

ing on the world the image they want to be accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather
than the realities of their natures... the right to privacy in any

event will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-

case development."39 (emphasis supplied)

But if no clear principle emerges out of the Court's elucidatio

right, it was fairly unambiguous in stressing the importance of the righ
Interestingly, it grounded the right within the context of the freedom

"Our founding fathers ," it observed, " were thoroughly opposed to a

even as our history of the struggle for freedom has borne eloquent testi
it:*0 The parallels to the American Fourth Amendment are striking h

historical analysis Akhil Amar tells us that the Fourth Amendment
precisely to avoid the various abuses of unreasonable searches and sei
were common in England at the time.41

The parallels with the United States become even more pronounced, ho
when the Court examined the grounds for limiting the right to privacy

'! Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a ci

penumbra I zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental r

39 Gobind , (1975) 2 SCC 148, 156.
40 Gobind , (1975) 2 SCC 148, 157.
41 Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998).
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fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compel

interest.'*42 (emphasis supplied)

" Compelling public interest " is an interest
'public interest' is a ground for fundamental

(see, e.g., Article 19(6)), but the text of th

and the Court, in interpreting them, has no

be " compelling ". This suggests a stricter
privacy right violation than Article 19 vio

that in the same paragraph, the Court ended
that Article 19(5) [restrictions upon the free
terms , as the right to privacy of movemen
reasonable restriction upon it for compelling

valid.'** (emphasis supplied) The Court ec

the word " compelling ". This surely cannot b

More importantly - the compelling State
often in equal protection cases and cases
classes' (such as race) are at issue. Because

issue, the compelling state interest test goes

row tailoring** Narrow tailoring places a b

that its restriction is tailored in a manner t

manner that is possible to achieve its goal

found in the American Supreme Court case o
"Even in the limited circumstance when

tions is permissible to further a compell

ernment is still constrained under eq
how it may pursue that end: the mean

the government's asserted purpose must
rowly framed to accomplish that purpose

To take an extremely trivial example tha

wants to ban hate speech against Dalits. It pa

that disrespects Dalits ." This is not narr
speech against Dalits necessarily disrespe
Dalits is not necessarily hate speech. It wa
legislation banning only hate speech against
upon free speech more narrowly than the "
goals. The law is not narrowly tailored.

42
43
44
45

Gobind
Gobind
Grutter
Grutter

; (1975) 2 SCC 148, 157.
, (1975) 2 SCC 148, 158.
v. Bollinger , 539 US 306, 333 (2003).
v. Bollinger , 539 US 306, 333 (2003).
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Crucially, then, the Court in Gobincř 6 seemed to implicitly accept th

row-tailoring flip side of the compelling state interest coin. On the constitu
ality of the Police Regulations itself, it upheld their constitutionality by rea
them narrowly. Here is what the Court said:

"Regulation 855, in our view, empowers surveillance only of
persons against whom reasonable materials exist to induce the
opinion that they show a determination, to lead a life of crime

- crime in this context being confined to such as involve public peace or security only and if they are dangerous security
risks. Mere convictions in criminal cases where nothing gravely

imperiling safety of society cannot be regarded as warranting
surveillance under this Regulation. Similarly, domiciliary visits and picketing by the police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security and not routine
follow-up at the end of a conviction or release from prison or at

the whim of a police officer.'*7 (emphasis supplied)
But Regulation 855 did not refer to the gravity of the crime at all. Thus, the

Court was able to uphold its constitutionality only by narrowing its scope in a
manner that the State* s objective of securing public safety was met in a way that
minimally infringed the right to privacy .

Therefore, whether the Gobincř 8 bench was aware of it or not, its holding
incorporates into Indian constitutional law and the right to privacy, not just the
compelling State interest test , but narrow tailoring as well. The implications for

surveillance systems such as the CMS and Netra are obvious. Because with narrow tailoring, the State must demonstrate that bulk surveillance of all individuals, whether guilty or innocent, suspected of crimes or not suspected of crimes
(whether reasonably or otherwise), possessing a past criminal record or not, speak-

ing to each other of breaking up the government or breaking up a relationship
- every bit of data must be collected to achieve the goal of maintaining public
security, and that nothing narrower will suffice. Can the State demonstrate this?
Perhaps it can; but at the very least, it should be made to do so in open Court.

IV. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION,
AND THE COURT'S WRONG TURN

We have seen that Gobincř 9 essentially crystallized a constitutio

privacy as an aspect of personal liberty, to be infringed only by a nar
46 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
47 Gobind , (1975) 2 SCC 148, 158.

48 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
49 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
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lored law that served a compelling state interest. After the landmark d
Go bind50, Malak Singh v. State of P&H 51 was the next targeted-surve
tory-sheeter case to come before the Supreme Court. In that case, Rule

Punjab Police Rules was at issue. Its vires was not disputed, so the q
a direct matter of constitutionality. An order of surveillance was c
two individuals, on the ground that there were no reasonable bases for
them of being repeat criminals, and that their inclusion in the surveil
ister was politically motivated. After holding that entry into a surveil
was a purely administrative measure, and thus required no prior h
alteram partem ), the Court then embarked upon a lengthy disquisition
scope and limitations of surveillance, which deserves to be reproduced

"... the police [do not] have a licence to enter the names of
whoever they like (dislike?) in the surveillance register; nor can

the surveillance be such as to squeeze the fundamental free
doms guaranteed to all citizens or to obstruct the free exercis
and enjoyment of those freedoms; nor can the surveillance s
intrude as to offend the dignity of the individual. Surveillance
of persons who do not fall within the categories mentioned i
Rule 23.4 or for reasons unconnected with the prevention of
crime, or excessive surveillance falling beyond the limits pre
scribed by the rules, will entitle a citizen to the Court's pro
tection which the court will not hesitate to give. The very rules
which prescribe the conditions for making entries in the surveil
lance register and the mode of surveillance appear to recognis
the caution and care with which the police officers are required
to proceed. The note following R. 23.4 is instructive. It enjoin
a duty upon the police officer to construe the rule strictly and
confine the entries in the surveillance register to the class o
persons mentioned in the rule. Similarly R.23.7 demands tha
there should be no illegal interference in the guise of survei
lance. Surveillance, therefore, has to be unobstrusive and within
bounds. Ordinarily the names of persons with previous criminal
record alone are entered in the surveillance register. They must
be proclaimed offenders, previous convicts, or persons who have
already been placed on security for good behaviour. In addition,
names of persons who are reasonably believed to be habitua

offenders or receivers of stolen property whether they have been

convicted or not may be entered. It is only in the case of th

category of persons that there may be occasion for abuse of the

power of the police officer to make entries in the surveillanc

register. But, here, the entry can only be made by the order of
50 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
51 (1981) 1 SCC 420.
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the Superintendent of Police who is prohibited from delegating

his authority under Rule 23.5. Further it is necessary that the
Superintendent of Police must entertain a reasonable belief that

persons whose names are to be entered in Part II are habitual
offenders or receivers of stolen property. While it may not be
necessary to supply the grounds of belief to the persons whose

names are entered in the surveillance register it may become
necessary in some cases to satisfy the Court when an entry is
challenged that there are grounds to entertain such reasonable

belief." (emphasis supplied)

Three things emerge from this holding: first
locating the right to privacy within the philos

nity , found in Article 21's guarantee of per

Kharak Singh53, R.M. Malkani 54 and Gobincř 5
be targeted, limited to fulfilling the governme
and be limited - not even to suspected criminal
ous criminals. And thirdly , it leaves open a rol

review - in examining the grounds of survei
case.

After Malak Singh 56, there is another period of quiet. LI

Shah 57, in 1993, attributed - wrongly - to Indian Express News
osition that Article 19(l)(a)'s free expression right included priv
cations ( Indian Express itself had cited a UN Report without in
its holding).58

Soon afterwards, R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.59 involved t
publication of a convicted criminal's autobiography by a pub
Shankar, the convict in question, had supposedly withdrawn

agreeing to the book's publication, but the publishing house was

ahead with it. Technically, this wasn't an Article 21 case: so

by the very manner in which the Court frames its issues: the q
a citizen of the country can prevent another person from writin
life story.60 The Court itself made things clear when it held th
vacy has two aspects: the tortious aspect, which provides damag
individual privacy; and the constitutional aspect , which protect
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

(1975) 2 SCC 148.
AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
(1973) 1 SCC 471.
(1975) 2 SCC 148.
(1981) 1 SCC 420.
(1992) 3 SCC 637.
(1992) 3 SCC 637, 651.
(1994) 6 SCC 632 (" Rajagopal" ).
Rajagopal , (1994) 6 SCC 632, 639.
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unlawful governmental intrusion. Having made this distinction,
on to cite a number of American cases that were precisely about the

vacy against governmental intrusion, and therefore - ideally - ir

present case61; and then, without quite explaining how it was using
or whether they were relevant at all, it switched to examining the
tion. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, in light of the clear d
it made, the Court was concerned in Rajagopal62 about an action bet
parties, and therefore, privacy in the context of tort law. Its confu
tions, however, were to have rather unfortunate effects, as we shal

We now come to a series of curious cases involving privacy an
In 'X* v. Hospital 'Z*3, the question arose whether a Hospital tha
text of a planned marriage - had disclosed the appellant's HIV+
to his social ostracism - was in breach of his right to privacy. T

Rajagopal 64, but unfortunately failed to understand it, and turned
into one of the constitutional right to privacy , and not the private

the Court turned an issue between two private parties - adequ
by the tort of breach of confidentiality - into an Article 21 issu

guess. Surely Article 21 - the right to life and personal liberty - is
tally applicable, because if it was, we might as well scrap the entire

Code, which deals with exactly these kinds of issues - individual
others' rights to life and personal liberty. Nonetheless, the Cour
Singh65, Gobincř 6 and Article 8 of the European Convention of

further muddying the waters, because Article 8 - in contrast to Am
embodies a proportionality test for determining whether there has

missible infringement of privacy. The Court then came up with
observation:

"Where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights, as in the
instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy as part of

right to life and Ms. Akali's right to lead a healthy life which
is her Fundamental Right under Article 21, the RIGHT which
would advance the public morality or public interest, would
alone be enforced through the process of Court, for the reason
that moral considerations cannot be kept at bay."67
With respect, this is utterly bizarre. If there is a clash of two rights, then that
clash must be resolved by referring to the Constitution , and not to the Court's
61 Rajagopal , (1994) 6 S CC 632, 643.
62 (1994) 6 SCC 632.

63
64
65
66
67

(1998) 8 SCC
(1994) 6 SCC
AIR 1963 SC
(1975) 2 SCC
(1998) 8 SCC

296.
632.
1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
148.
296, 309.
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opinion of what an amorphous, elastic, malleable, many-sizes-fit "publ
ity says. The mischief caused by this decision, however, was replica
Sharda v. Dharmpaf i8, decided by the Court in 2003. In that case, the
was whether the Court could require a party who had been accused of
ness of mind (as a ground for divorce under the wonderfully progress
Marriage Act, 1956) to undergo a medical examination - and draw an
inference if she refused. Again, whether this was a case in which A
ought to be invoked is doubtful; at least, it is arguable, since it was t
making the order. Predictably, the Court cited from 'X' v. Hospital 'Z
sively. It cited Gobinď0 (compelling State interest) and the ECHR (prop

ity). It cited a series of cases involving custody of children, where various

had used a 'balancing tesť to determine whether the best interests of

overrode the privacy interest exemplified by the client-patient privilege.
this balancing test to the case at hand by balancing the 'right' of the peti
obtain a divorce for the spouse's unsoundness of mind under the HMA
the Respondent's right to privacy.

In light of the above analysis, it is submitted that although the o
in 'X' v. Hospital 'Z'71 and Sharda v. DharmpaP might well be correc
Supreme Court has misread what RajagopaP actually held, and its reas
deeply flawed. Neither of these cases are Article 21 cases: they are pr
cases between private parties, and ought to be analysed under private
RajagopaP itself was careful to point out. In private law, also, the balan

makes perfect sense: there are a series of interests at stake, as the Court
understood, such as certain rights arising out of marriage, all of a private

In any event, whatever one might make of these judgments, one thin

they are both logically and legally irrelevant to the Kharak Singh 75 line
that we have been discussing, which are to do with the Article 21 right t
against the State.
V. PUCL V. UNION OF INDIA

Let us return, now, to our paradigm cases of surveillance. In
Supreme Court decided People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v
India™ This case is the most important privacy case after Gobinď
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

(2003) 4 SCC
(1998) 8 SCC
(1975) 2 SCC
(1998) 8 SCC
(2003) 4 SCC
(1994) 6 SCC
(1994) 6 SCC
AIR 1963 SC
(1997) 1 SCC
(1975) 2 SCC

493.
296.
148.
296.
493.
632.
632.
1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
301 ("PUCL").
148.
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most important case for our purposes, that of studying surveillance
deserves very close study.

At issue in PUCLn was telephone tapping, which is - for obv

- central to our enquiry. In PUCL 79, the constitutionality of Section
Telegraph Act was at issue. This Section reads:

"On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the intere
of public safety, the Central Government or a State Governm
or any Officer specially authorised in this behalf by the Cent

Govt, or a State Government may, if satisfied that it is ne

sary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty
integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relation
with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitem
to the commission of and offence, for reasons to be recorded

writing, by order, direct that any message clear of messages t

or from any person or classes of persons, relating to any p
ticular subject, brought for transmission by or transmitted

received by any telegraph, shall not be transmitted, or shall b
intercepted or detailed, or shall be disclosed to the Governmen
making the order or an officer thereof mentioned in the order.

(emphasis supplied)

Section 5(2), therefore, gives rise to a number of issues. The first
ing of the terms "public emergency ' and " public safety ". The second
ing of the terms " persons or class of persons ". And the third - and

core of the arguments in the PUCL case%x - is the scope of the proc
guards required to make this section constitutionally legitimate. A c

of the case, I suggest, places PUCLn firmly within the continuin

Kharak Singh 83 and Gobind ®4, in setting stringent safeguards upon
of privacy.

The first thing to note is whether Section 5(2) is relevant at all to the question
of bulk surveillance, a la CMS and Netra. There are at least three reasons to suggest that it is not. First , the Indian Telegraph Act is an 1885 legislation, drafted at
a time when bulk surveillance was unimaginable, and aimed at addressing a very
different problem - interception of individual telegraphic messages for specific,
short-term purposes. Secondly , the term " persons or class of persons " in Section
78 (1997) 1 SCC 301.
79 (1997) 1 SCC 301.
80 S. 5(2), Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

81
82
83
84

(1997) 1 SCC
(1997) 1 SCC
AIR 1963 SC
(1975) 2 SCC

301.
301.
1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
148.
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5(2) is clearly indicative of identifiable individuals (or classes of individual

is not meant to include the citizenry as a whole. And thirdly , the Co

guidelines militate against reading permission for bulk surveillance into t

(I'll come to this later). Section 5(2), therefore, does not authorize bulk
lance, and does not authorize the CMS or Netra.

That said, let us now examine the development of privacy law in

The Court held unambiguously that individuals had a privacy interest in t
tent of their telephone communications. It cited Kharak Singh*5, Gobincř
RajagopaP1 for the proposition that privacy was a protected right und
21. Coming, then, to the all-important interpretation of "public emer
" public safety ", the Court held - and, it is submitted, correctly - that t
phrases " take their colour off each other". It defined public safety as the
safety or freedom from danger for the public at large, and argued that n
public emergency nor public safety could be " secretive ", but must be ev
the reasonable person.

There is an elementary reason why "public emergency" and "public

cannot be given widely divergent interpretations. This is because if the st

embodied by one was laxer than the standard embodied by the other,

latter would become redundant: in other words, if " public safety " is int
more broadly than public emergency, then there would be no point to ha
phrase " public emergency " at all, because any public emergency would n
ily be a matter of public safety. The two categories must therefore be no
lapping, referring to different aspects, and requiring roughly the same s
to be attracted. This argument is buttressed by the fact that the Court r

a proclamation of an Emergency via public notification: now if that p
safeguard is required in one case (Emergency), but the government ca
get around it by doing the same thing (phone interception) under the

public safety then, once again, " public emergency " becomes an almost re
category, something clearly beyond the expectation of the legislature. For
safety " to have any teeth, therefore, it must refer to a specific situation

fiable danger - and not a general, vague idea - perhaps - of containing
terrorist threats.

This position is buttressed by the Court's citation of the Press Com

Recommendations, which used the phrases " national security ", " public o
and " investigation of crimes "88 the Press Commission also urged regular

and expiry within three months, once again suggesting that what was
plated was a specific response to a specific situation, one that would ex
the situation itself expired (this is in keeping with the targeted-su
85 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.

86 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
87 (1994) 6 SCC 632.
88 PUCL, (1997) 1 SCC 301, 315.
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focus that we have seen in Kharak Singh*9, R.M. Malkanř °, Gobinď 1
MaP1). The Commission also categorically ran together 41 public emer
"public safety ", by holding that in the interests of public safety, th
power should be exercised one month at a time, extendible if the eme
tinued (as we have argued above, this makes sense).

After citing the Press Commission observations with approval, the

addressed the question of whether judicial review was necessary.

from the English Interceptions Act of 1985, it held that it was not. T
Government had the authority to make the rules governing the spec
of the interception power. Since it had not done so for all these year
the Court stepped in to fill the breach.

The Court's rules are extremely instructive in order to underst
veillance and privacy interact with each other. Under Rules 2 and

required that the communications to be intercepted be specified (Rule

persons and the addresses specified as well (Rule 4); this is a very
scription against general warrants - see, e.g., the American Fourth

- " no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oa

mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and t
things to be seized".93 (emphasis supplied) The whole purpose of this
Fourth Amendment was to mitigate the evil - prevalent under Br
rule - of general warrants, giving a blank cheque to colonial officials
widespread, dragnet invasions of privacy, as happened in the lan
Entick v. Carrington94 Indeed, the Virginia Declaration of Rights
precursors of the Fourth Amendment, recognized even more explicit
gers to liberty that general warrants embodied, and clearly made
about containing untrammeled executive power, and subjecting it
law:

"That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger ma

be commanded to search suspected places without evidence

a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named
or whose offense is not particularly described and supported b
evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be gran

ed."96 (emphasis supplied)

89
90
91
92

AIR 1963 SC
(1973) 1 SCC
(1975) 2 SCC
(1974) 1 SCC

1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
471.
148.
345.

VJ Amendment IV, united States Constitution, 1792.

94 (1765) 19 Howells' State Trials 1029 : 95 ER 807.
95 Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776.
96 S. 10, Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776.
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Therefore, Rule 4, based as it is upon such lineage, clarifies beyond any

that Section 5(2) does not permit bulk, indiscriminate surveillance; bec

did, it would not make any sense to require specificity of disclosure for c

nication, persons and addresses. Once again, the idea is simple: the gov
must act on some reasonably strong suspicion before it begins to infr
zens' privacy - it cannot simply do so on a general belief that at some

the future the information it gleans might come in use; and it cannot int

the data - and intrude upon the privacy of - innocent citizens, suspec
wrongdoing.
Rules 3 and 7, read together, codify the narrow tailoring rule: Rule 3 requires

the government to take into account whether "(he information which is considered necessary to acquire could reasonably be acquired by other means."
(emphasis supplied)97 Rule 7 states: " the use of intercepted material shall be
limited to the minimum that is necessary in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act ."
(emphasis supplied)98 The minimum necessary and reasonable acquisition by
other means are a clear enunciation of the narrow tailoring rule, that requires the
infringement of a right to be narrowly tailored to the legitimate State goal, and

holds it invalid if that goal could be achieved in a manner that was less of an
infringement upon the right in question.

What, then, are we to take away from PUCL "? In my view, three things:

(a) Neither the Telegraph Act nor the Court contemplates bulk surveillance.
Consequently, the Court's specific view that targeted surveillance does not
need judicial review is not necessarily true for bulk surveillance.
(b) Rigorous standards are needed to justify an infringement of privacy rights
- in other words, a compelling State interest (although the Court does not
use the specific term).
(c) Privacy restrictions must be narrowly tailored, if they are to be constitutional. This means that they must be targeted, based on specific suspicion

of identifiable individuals (as opposed to a general dragnet sweep), and
the only means possible to fulfill the government's goals of public safety

and crime prevention. In both (b) and (c), therefore, the Court continues
with the strong privacy-protection standards developed in Gobincf 00, and
afterwards.

97 PUCL, (1997) 1 SCC 301, 317.
98 PUCL , (1997) 1 SCC 301, 318.
99 (1997) 1 SCC 301.
100 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
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And at the end of the day, it affirms one very basic thought: that fo
to flourish, there is an aspect of all our lives that must remain private
government.
VI. AFTER PUCL

We noted how PUCL101 entrenches a compelling state interest/narr

test for infringements of privacy. Cases after PUCL102 are a mixed b

v. Cañara Bank J03, decided in 2005, is notable for containing the
examination of the development of American law, as well as Ind
searches and seizures and the associated right to privacy. In that
73 of the Stamp Act, that allowed - inter alia - the Collector to a
records that would normally be subject to the confidentiality relation
banker and customer, was challenged. The Court made two very impor
vations: responding to the contention that once one had voluntari
one's bank records to a third party, there was no privacy interest
them (as held in the much-critcised American case of United States v.
the Court made an obiter observation in Gobincř 05 the centerpiece of

"... the right to privacy deals with 'persons and not places', t
documents or copies of documents of the customer which a
in [sic] Bank, must continue to remain confidential vis-à-vis th
person, even if they are no longer at the customer's house a
have been voluntarily sent to a Bank.... once that is so, th
unless there is some probable or reasonable cause or reasonab
basis or material before the Collector for reaching an opini
that the documents in the possession of the Bank tend to secur
any duty or to prove or to lead to the discovery of any fraud o
omission in relation to any duty, the search or taking notes
extracts therefore, cannot be valid. The above safeguards mu
necessarily be read into the provision relating to search an
inspection and seizure so as to save it from any unconstitution-

ality."106 (emphasis supplied)

Three things stand out: the first is an affirmation
vests in persons (consequently, when we support thi
the privacy interest in phone data becomes inescap

line with all previous cases, the Court requires re
,01
102
103
104
105
106
107

(1997) 1
(1997) 1
(2005) 1
48 L Ed
(1975) 2

SCC 301.
SCC 301.
SCC 496 (" Cañara Bank").
2d 71 : 425 US 435 (1976) ("M//er").
SCC 148.

Cañara Bank, , (2005) 1 SCC 496, 523.
(1997) 1 SCC 301.
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surveillance in question (in this case, a search and seizure) is undertaken.

again, then, there is a clear indication that anything more than a targeted sea

is ipso facto unreasonable. And thirdly , the Court reads down a provisio

mean that in order to save it from unconstitutionality (as it read procedural
guards into Section 5(2) Telegraph Act, and as it will hopefully do to the IT A
The Court's second holding is equally interesting:

"Secondly, the impugned provision in sec. 73 enabling the
Collector to authorize 'any person' whatsoever to inspect, to
take notes or extracts from the papers in the public office suf-

fers from the vice of excessive delegation as there are no
guidelines in the Act... under the garb of the power conferred
by Section 73 the person authorized may go on [sic] rampage
searching house after house i.e. residences of the persons or the

places used for the custody of documents. The possibility of
any wild exercise of such power may be remote but then on the
framing of Section 73, the provision impugned herein, the possi-

bility cannot be ruled out."108 (emphasis supplied)
This paragraph is critical, because for the first time, the Court rules that if the
framing of the legislation leaves it open to an abuse of privacy rights, then the
legislation is constitutionally problematic even though the possibility of abuse is

remote. And this is what is precisely the problem with bulk surveillance - collecting the content of every citizens' communications reveals to the government
(and, by extension, private contractors, to the extent they are involved) everything

about your personal life. Your religious beliefs, your political views, what you
watch on the internet, which restaurant you go to eat, your friends, workmates

and lovers - one doesn't need so summon up an Orwellian dystopia to understand the vast possibility of abuse here, abuse that was not even contemplated
by the judges in Cañara Bank109 who held Section 73 unconstitutional, abuse that
is ripe for being inflicted upon dissidents and unpopular minorities, precisely the
groups that a Constitution is most required to protect. It is submitted, therefore,
that both aspects of the Cañara Bank 110 holding make it extremely difficult to justify across-the-board bulk surveillance.

Following on from Cañara Banku' in P.R. Metrani v. C/7112, a search and
seizure provision in the Income Tax Act (Section 132(5)) was construed strictly
as it constituted a "serious invasion into the privacy of a citizen ." Similarly,

,os Cañara Bank , (2005) 1 SCC 496, 524.
109 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
1,0 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
1,1 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
1,2 (2007) 1 SCC 789.
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Directorate of Revenue v. Mohd. Nisar Holiam involved the inte
the search and seizure provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the ND

both Cañara BanknA and Gobind !l5, the Court held that the right to

crucial, and imposed a strict requirement of written recording of
again, notice the targeted nature of the search) before an NDPS s
zure could be carried out.

In light of these cases, the Court's 2008 judgment in State of Maharashtra v.
Bharat Shanti Lai Shah116 must rank among the more disappointing opinions that

the Court has handed down in an area in which its jurisprudence has been satisfactory, as a whole. Bharat Shanti Lai Shah 1,7 involved a constitutional challenge
to Sections 13 - 16 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act that, like
PUCLm , involved provisions for interception of telephone (and other wireless)
communications. The Court dismissed the contention in a paragraph, refusing to
take the trouble of a meaningful analysis:

"The object of the MCOCA is to prevent the organised crime
and a perusal of the provisions of Act under challenge would
indicate that the said law authorizes the interception of wire,
electronic or oral communication only if it is intended to prevent the commission of an organised crime or if it is intended
to collect the evidence to [sic] the commission of such an organ-

ized crime. The procedures authorizing such interception are
also provided therein with enough procedural safeguards, some

of which are indicated and discussed hereinbefore."119

It is disappointing that the Court does not even refer to compelling State interest or narrow tailoring, although the underlined portion might hint at something

of the sort. Nonetheless, if we scrutinize the impugned provisions closely, we
can understand the kind of safeguards that the Court found satisfactory. Section

14, for example, requires details of the organized crime that "is being committed " or is " about to be committed ' before surveillance may be authorized; the
requirements include, in addition, a description of the " nature and location of the
facilities " from which the communication is to be intercepted, the " nature of the
communication " and, if known, " the identity of the person ." In addition, Section

14(2)(c) requires a "statement as to whether or not other modes of enquiry or
intelligence gathering have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous or is likely to expose the
1,3 (2008) 2 SCC 370.
,M (2005) 1 SCC 496.
1,5 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
1,6 (2008) 13 SCC 5 (" Bharat Shanti Lai Shah").
1,7 (2008) 13 SCC 5.
1,8 (1997) 1 SCC 301.
1,9 Bharat Shanti Lai Shah , (2008) 13 SCC 5, 28.
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identity of those connected with the operation of interception ."l20 Secti

requires special reasons for surveillance to continue after information
received. An extension application, under Section 14(2)(f), requires an

results thus far. Section 14(8) limits duration to sixty days, permitting ex

on specific grounds but only - again - for a period of sixty days, and
" minimal interception ."
The attentive reader will note that this is - in terms - a codification of the

PUCLm rules. Like PUCLm , the focus of these rules is to prevent abuse through

specificity : specificity of individuals and locations, specificity of duration of
surveillance, specificity of reasons. Once again - and it almost no longer bears
repeating - surveillance is tolerated only because of its narrow, targeted nature,

a position further buttressed by the Section 14(2)(c) requirement of exhausting all other options that achieve the same goal without infringing upon privacy

before actually resorting to interception. Thus, even though the Bharat Shanti
Lai Shah123 bench did not refer to compelling State interest and narrow tailoring, it is obvious that their upholding of MCOCA was predicated upon these
considerations.

VII. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
AND UNTIDY ENDNOTES

Cañara Bankm departed from the American Supreme Court case of M

in basing privacy upon a personal as opposed to propertarian, found
vacy is of persons , not places "). Miller l26, however, also stood for an

proposition known as the 'third party doctrine', which has direct i
for the law of privacy in the context of the CMSection. It is cruci

ine Miller 127 in relation to Cañara Bankm with respect to that. If Caña

rejects the third-party doctrine, then this has profound implications f
stitutionality of CMS-surveillance; we must therefore pay close attentio
issue.

Before we commence, one distinction: there is a difference between t

tapping (which R.M. Malkanim held as certainly violating a privacy inte
telephone records that are held by telephone companies and are then tu
120
121
122
123

S. 14(2)(c), Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999.
(1997) 1 SCC 301.
(1997) 1 SCC 301.
(2008) 13 SCC 5.

124 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
125 48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435 (1976).
126 48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435 (1976).
127 48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435 (1976).
,2S (2005) 1 SCC 496.
129 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
130 (1973) 1 SCC 471.

This content downloaded from
13.234.96.8 on Fri, 14 Oct 2022 21:17:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

VOL. 26 STATE SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INDIA 149

to the government (the NSA's PRISM project, the GCHQ's Tempora P
our very own CMS). The third-party doctrine isn't applicable to R.

case 131 of the government directly tapping your line, but becomes very

precisely when the information is routed to the government via a third

this case, the telecom companies). Since there is no settled case in In
knowledge) on CMS/PRISM style surveillance, we must examine the
doctrine as developed elsewhere.

Recall that in Millerm , the question was whether a person had a priv

est in personal records held by a bank. The Court held he did not, since

"The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,

that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Governmen
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."133

(emphasis supplied)

This is known as the third-party doctrine. Speaking for four membe
Court in dissent, Justice Brennan rejected it, reasoning that:

"[A] depositor reveals many aspects of his personal affairs,
opinions, habits, associations. Indeed, the totality of ban
records provides a virtual current biography. . . . Developmen
of photocopying machines, electronic computers and other

sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of govern-

ment to intrude into areas which a person normally chooses t
exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds."134

Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland135, the question arose wheth
register (that is, an electronic device that records all numbers called fr
ticular telephone line), installed on the telephone's company's property,
upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court held that it did not

"Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey

numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that
131 (1973) 1 SCC 471.

132
133
134
135

48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435 (1976).
Miller , 48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435, 443 (1976).
Miller , 48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435, 451 (1976).
61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
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the phone company does in fact record this information for a
variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances,
harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will

remain secret."136 (emphasis supplied)

Smith v. Maryland 37 is essentially the third-party doctrine applied

records. Records in question are knowingly and voluntarily passed
party (the telephone company), the customers being aware that the t
storing and recording them. Consequently, there is no reasonable
privacy. Of course, there is a gap in the logic: the fact that we have
ble expectation of privacy against the telephone company storing
our data does not mean that we have no reasonable expectation of
government will not do so. Nonetheless, Smith v. Maryland 38 was w
ernment has relied upon in the recent NSA litigations across Am
Courts. In the oral arguments in ACLU v. Clapper 139, which wa
challenge to NSA surveillance before the New York District Court140
ment's entire privacy argument was based upon the Smith v. Maryla
and ACLU's counter-arguments turned upon how, in the last thirty
of the telephone had increased so much, with so many personal detai
of phone records, that Smith 142 no longer held the field.

Soon after the ACLU arguments, in November 2013, in Klayman v

Judge Leon at the Columbia District Court accepted in substan
argument. He observed that " the relationship between the pol
company in Smith is nothing compared to the relationship that
evolved over the last seven years between the Government and t

nies ",44 - that is, a formalized policy as opposed to a one-time collec
Leon then went on to hold that not only was the government's surv

nology vastly more all-encompassing than it had been in 1979,
"the nature and quantity of information contained in peoples' tel

much greater as we//."145 The " ubiquity " of phones had altered bo
of information available, and what that information could tell gover

peoples' lives (and indeed, previously on the blog146 we have discu
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Smith v. Maryland , 61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735, 743 (1979).
61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
959 F Supp 2d 724 (2014) (New York District Court).
959 F Supp 2d 724 (2014) (New York District Court) ("ACLU").
61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
957 F Supp 2d 1 (2013) (Columbia District Court).
Klayman v. Obama , 957 F Supp 2d 1, 38 (2013).
Klayman v. Obama , 957 F Supp 2d 1, 39 (2013).
See <https://indconUwphil.wordpress.com> (last visited on 28-1-2015).
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surveillance of telephone records can enable government to construct

record of a person's social, sexual, religious and political mores).

Judge Leon held that there was likely to be a reasonable expectation o
telephone records.

Does Cañara Bank147, in rejecting Miller 148, reject the third-party

well? I believe so, although not unambiguously. In the Court's mi

party doctrine is a corollary of the propertarian theory of privacy. T
graph 54, the Court observes:

"Once we have accepted in Gobind 49 and in latter cases that th

right to privacy deals with 'persons and not places', the do
ments or copies of documents of the customer which are
Bank, must continue to remain confidential vis-à-vis the p

son, even if they are no longer at the customer's house and hav

been voluntarily sent to a Bank."150 (emphasis supplie

The Court here conflates " no longer at the customer's house"

places) and " voluntarily sent to the Bank''' (third party). Because even

that the right to privacy belongs to persons and not places, it is
sible to hold that once one voluntarily turns over one's informati
else, one no longer has a privacy interest in it. The Court, howev

forecloses that option by reading the two together - because the righ

belongs to persons and not to places, therefore we retain our priv

even in those documents that we have voluntarily turned over to a th
other words, the Court's logic appears to be that the nature of the do
à-vis us remains unchanged despite their location shifts from beyond
even if this shift is knowingly and voluntarily cause by us. Thus, it
that Cañara Bankxsx adopts a particular conception of privacy-interes
peoples-and-not-places, one that rejects the third party doctrine. To

is not the only way in which we can understand the people/plac
conceptually, people/places and third-party come apart, as they h
American law. What we have tried to do here is to make sense of the Cañara

Bank}51 holding, and I submit that the only way to do so is to understand Cañara

Bank 153 as rejecting third party through one specific conception of people/
places. Thus, the Smith v. Maryland 54 argument is not open to the government

147
148
149
150
151

(2005) 1 SCC 496.
48 L Ed 2d 71 : 425 US 435, 443 (1976).
(1975) 2 SCC 148.
Cañara Bank , (2005) 1 SCC 496, 523.
(2005) 1 SCC 496.

152 (2005) 1 SCC 496.

153 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
154 61 L Ed 2d 220 : 442 US 735 (1979).
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if it wishes to collect data from telecom companies or, in the case of the int
ISPs. In light of Cañara Bank155, the privacy interest remains.

We may now end our substantive privacy law discussion by a brief exa
tion of two cases whose locus lies in the domain of medical tests, althou

differing areas. Selvi v. State of Karnataka156, decided in 2010, involved the
stitutionality of narco-analysis and polygraph tests during police investigatio
and the testimonial statements obtained therefrom. The Court had no trouble in

finding that, insofar as these techniques interfered with a person's mental processes in order to elicit information from him, they infringed his right to privacy.
The Court then summarily rejected the State's argument of a compelling interest
in eliciting information that could lead to the prevention of crime, holding that:

"There is absolutely no ambiguity on the status of principles such as the 'right against self-incrimination' and the various dimensions of 'personal liberty'. We have already pointed
out that the rights guaranteed in Articles 20 and 21 of the
Constitution of India have been given a non-derogable status
and they are available to citizens as well as foreigners. It is not
within the competence of the judiciary to create exceptions and
limitations on the availability of these rights."157

(emphasis supplied)

This passage is curious. While a non-derogable right need not be an absolute
right, our privacy jurisprudence suggests that the right to privacy is indeed derogatale - when there is a compelling State interest. Insofar as Selvi 158 goes beyond
the accepted doctrine, it is probably incorrectly decided; nonetheless, it affirms
- once more - even if only through contentions made by the State, that the relevant standard for infringement is the compelling interest standard. Furthermore,

in subsequently investigating whether compelled undertaking of narco-analysis
or polygraph tests are actually likely to reveal the results that the investigating

authorities need - and finding them unconstitutional because they don't - the
Court takes a path that resembles narrow tailoring.

Lastly - and most recently - Rohit Shekhar v. Narayan Dutt Tiwari 159 dealt
with a Court order requiring a compulsory DNA test in a paternity dispute. After
lengthy citation of foreign precedent, the Court entered into a bewildering dis-

cussion of the relationship between DNA tests and the right to privacy. It held
that depending upon the circumstances of a case, mandatory testing would be

155 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
156 (2010) 7 SCC 263 ("Selvi").
157 Selvi , (2010) 7 SCC 263, 380.
158 (2010) 7 SCC 263.
159 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4076 (Delhi High Court) ("Rohit Shekhar).
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governed by a number of factors such as a compelling interest, a pro
decreased expectations of privacy, and so on. It then went on to hold

"forced interventions with an individual's privacy under huma

rights law in certain contingencies has been found justifia
when the same is founded on a legal provision ; serves a leg
mate aim ; is proportional ; fulfils a pressing social need ; a

most importantly, on the basis that there is no alternative, les
intrusive, means available to get a comparable result."160

This is extremely strange, because the first three conditions fo
classic proportionality test; and the last two are - as readers wi

the two parts of the compelling state interest - narrow tailoring tes
Court contradicts itself - " legitimate aim " and "pressing social need
be part of the test, since the latter makes the former redundant - a

need will necessarily be a legitimate aim. Consequently, it is subm

clear ratio emerges out of Rohit ShekharX6X. It leaves the previous l
that we have discussed exhaustively - untouched.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Our enquiry has spanned fifty years and many different aspec
touch an individual's personal life - from criminal law practices

lance, narco-analysis, self-incrimination) to phone-tapping, from ma
to the status of one's bank records. Despite the diversity of cases an
ing reasoning employed by judges to reach differing results over

seen that a careful analysis reveals certain unifying strands of l
ment that can provide a coherent philosophical and constitutiona
the right to privacy in Indian law, bases that the Court can - and
upon in order to decide an eventual CMS/bulk surveillance challen
pled manner.

We can commence by emphasizing the distinction between two set
cases, a distinction that the Court has failed to appreciate so far. On

involves privacy claims between private parties. Examples inclu

revealing a patient's medical records ('X' v. Hospital 'Z'162), or one sp

the other's phone ( Rayala v. Rayala163). Now, these cases involve

ment of a privacy right, but they do so as a matter of private law ,

tutional law. As a matter of principle, the remedies would lie in
of invasion of privacy, for instance, or breach of confidence. Th
cation of Article 21 in these cases must be deplored as a serious m
160 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4076, para 79.
161 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4076.

162 (1998) 8 SCC 296.
163 AIR 2008 AP 98.
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21 is sets out a constitutional right, and unless otherwise expressly pr

the Constitutional text (see, e.g., Article 15(2)), constitutional rights are ap

ble vertically against the State, and not horizontally between individu

again, a simply hypothetical will illustrate the absurdity of cases like Ray
A murders B. Very obviously, the law governing this incident is the India
Code, which defines murder and prescribes the punishment for it. A has
lated B's Article 21 right to life by murdering him. Now, there is someth
said for philosophical arguments that challenge the public/private State/i
dichotomy as a matter of first principle. That, however, is not our concer
Whatever the philosophical validity of the distinction, there is little doub
our Constitution subscribes to it quite explicitly, by having a Part III in t
place, and with provisions such as Articles 13 and 32.

There is one way of reconciling these cases. That is to read them not as
ing Article 21 as a ground for the decision , but invoking it to infuse the
to privacy with substantive content . That is, the private law right to pri
the constitutional right to privacy, while rooted in different sources and

able against different entities, nonetheless (reasonably enough) codify

abstract conception of what privacy is - and it is to that end that the Cou
private-party cases, cites Article 21.

This is crucial, because it helps to clarify the way in which th

rights are different, and to make sense of a jurisprudence that would

lessly incoherent otherwise. The difference lies in the standard for justif
infringement. In the private-party cases, the Court - rightly - treats the
as balancing various rights and interests involved of the different parties
case. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z'165, for instance - as understood by the Court - req
balancing of the patient's right to privacy against his future in-laws right

about prior, debilitating medical records in order that there be infor
sent to the marriage. Small wonder then, that in these cases the Cour
rightly - cites Article 8 of the ECHR, and analyses them in the lan
proportionality .

In cases involving the State, however, we have seen that the Court has (

uniformly) insisted upon the far higher standard of compelling State
Again, there is a logic to this distinction. The importance of maintain
vate sphere against State intrusion, the extent to which the State now
power to intrude (as we have all seen over the last six months), consi

that ultimately go to the heart of maintaining a free and democratic soci
justify (if not necessitate) a higher standard. Once we understand this, it

sible now to understand why the Supreme Court has adopted one tes

164 AIR 2008 AP 98.

165 (1998) 8 SCC 296.
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cases, and another test in other cases. The justification is a principle
the Supreme Court might not have been aware of it).

Proceeding, then, to the Article 21 constitutional right to privacy

has located this within Article 21's guarantee of personal liberty
cases - Kharak Singh 166 and Gobind 67 - the Court understood the

foundations of privacy to lie in the idea of individual dignity; th

thought that in order to live a dignified life, one must be able to h
action that is free from external invasion (this, essentially, is what is
phrase, often used by the Court, " the right to be left alone"). The
tification of privacy is to be sharply contrasted with another justif
held the field in American Constitutional law for a long while: the p
justification that grounds privacy in the idea that government is to
vate property. This is what is meant by the Supreme Court's slogan,
privacy belongs to persons , not places ."

Ultimately, possibly, the basic philosophy is similar - advocates

rights argue that without a certain measure of private property, an
not live an independent and dignified life. Practically, however, the
an analytical difference. A propertarian foundation - concretely - w
a set of spaces that are placed out of bounds (e.g., the Fourth Amend
"homes, papers , effects " etc.) The dignitarian foundation would ex

to acts and places with regard to which persons have a reasonable

privacy. Naturally, this will - and has - led to different results in p
the dignitarian foundation leading to more expansive privacy protec

The persons-not-places justification also led the Supreme Court
third-party doctrine, according to which privacy interest is lost
effects are voluntarily handed over to a third party. In Cañara Bank
emphasized that the character of those items - their personal
not change simply because their location has changed. The priva
retained, whether they are bank records, or telephone details.

These are the contours of the privacy right. Naturally, it is not a

the Court has taken pains to specify that on numerous occasion
justifies an infringement? The Court has consistently called for

State interest ", one that rises beyond the simple " public interest "

Article 19 restrictions. Side-by-side with compelling State inter
has also required - although it has never expressly spelt it out -

law to be narrowly tailored. In other words, the government must s

infringing law not only achieves the compelling State interest, b
way that restricts privacy in the narrowest possible manner. If
166 AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
167 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
168 (2005) 1 SCC 496.
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conceivable ways of achieving the same goal that do not infringe upon
to the extent the impugned law does, the law will be struck down. W

in the police surveillance cases, where in Gobinď 69, for instance, the Cou

into Regulation 855 an additional requirement of gravity, to ensure t
narrowly tailored; and we see it even more clearly in the phone-tapp
where the Court's rules require not only specification of persons, num

addresses, but also require the State to resort to surveillance only if other

ods are not reasonably open, and in so doing, to infringe privacy mi
Targeting, indeed, is critical: all the surveillance cases that we have
have not only involved specific, targeted surveillance (indeed, Secti
the Telegraph Act only envisages targeted surveillance), but the very
the surveillance is targeted and aimed at individuals against whom t
more than reasonable grounds of suspicion, has been a major - almost

tive - ground on which the Court has found the surveillance to be constit
Targeting, therefore, seems to be an integral aspect of narrow tailoring.

I do not mean to suggest that the above is a complete philosophical acco
privacy. It ignores, for instance, the very legitimate concern that creatin
vate sphere only serves to justify relations of non-State domination and o

sion within that sphere - both symbolically, and actually (see, for ins
infamous marital rape exception in Indian criminal law). It presumes

of arguing for - the basic philosophical idea of the ultimate unit of societ
indivisibly, atomized individual selves living in hermetically sealed 'zones'
vacy, an assumption that has come under repeated attack in more than fi
of social theory. I hope to explore these arguments another day, but the p

of this paper has been primarily doctrinal, not philosophical: to look a
lance in the framework of established constitutional doctrine without que
- at least for now - the normative foundations of the doctrine itself.

Our conclusions, then, summarized very briefly:
- the right to privacy is an aspect of Article 21 's guarantee of personal liberty, and is grounded in the idea that a free and dignified life requires a
private sphere

- one does not necessarily lose one's privacy interest in that which one
hands over to a third party

- an infringement of privacy must be justified by a compelling state interest,
and the infringing law must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest

As far as the CMS, Netra and other dragnet surveillance mechanisms go,
it is clear, then, that they implicate a privacy interest; and to justify them, the
169 (1975) 2 SCC 148.
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government must show that there is no other way in which it could
goals (of combating terrorism etc) without bulk surveillance on an
scale.

But if recent judgments of our Supreme Court do not exactly instill confidence
in its role as the guarantor of our civil liberties170, its long-term record in national

security cases is even worse. A.K. Gopalanm , Habeas Corpus 112 and the 2004
People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of lndiam come to mind as examples.
It is therefore unclear how the Court will rule on a CMS/surveillance challenge.
One thing is clear, though: the privacy law jurisprudence that it has developed
over the last fifty years provide it with all the analytical tools to fulfil its constitutional mandate of protecting civil liberties. Consistent with the narrow tailoring test, the Supreme Court ought not to allow the government to baldly get
away with asserting a national security interest, but require it to demonstrate not
only how national security is served by dragnet surveillance, but also how drag-

net surveillance is the only reasonable way of achieving national security goals.
The possibility of abuse is too great, and the lessons that history teaches us - that
totalitarianism always begins with pervasive governmental spying over individuals - is to be ignored at our peril.

In the meantime, privacy jurisprudence continues to explode worldwide. The
end of 2013 witnessed the beginnings of the pushback against the American surveillance state. In his opinion on the Columbia Circuit Bench, which we referred

to earlier, not only did Judge Leon hold the NSA spying program likely to be
unconstitutional, but notably, he refused to accept NSA claims of national security on their face. He went into the record, and found that out of the 54 instances
that the NSA had cited of allegedly foiled terrorist plots, it had miserably failed
to prove even one where the outcome would have been different without bulk
surveillance. This is a classic example of how narrow tailoring works. And later
in the week, the Review Panel set up by President Obama emphatically rejected
the contention that bulk surveillance is a necessary compromise to make in
the liberty/security balance.174 Nor is the United States alone; in June 2014, the
Canadian Supreme Court handed down its decision in R. v. Spencer l75, where it
prohibited the warrantless disclosure of basic subscriber information by internet
companies, to law-enforcement agencies. The foundations of the Court's decision
evidently included a rejection of the third-party doctrine, an expanded understanding of privacy, and the holding of the government to a high standard of
proof before privacy could be violated 'in the interests of law and order.

Suresh Kumar Kousha / v. Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1.

A.K. Gopalan v. Stale of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 : 1950 SCR 88.
m ADM, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521.
(2004) 2 SCC 476.
174 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F Supp 2d 1 (2013) (Columbia District Court).
1,5 2014 SCC 43 (Supreme Court of Canada).
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Given all this, and given the worldwide pushback underway against such
veillance measures, from Brazil to Germany, it would be a constitutional t

if the Supreme Court ignored its own well-crafted jurisprudence and let t

ernment go ahead with bulk surveillance on the basis of asserted and
national security claims. Tragic, but perhaps not entirely unexpected.
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